The ever-increasing complexity and sophistication of computer and network attacks challenge society's dependability on digital infrastructure. Digital investigations recover and reconstruct the digital trails of such events and may employ practices from various subfields (computer, network forensics), each with its own set of techniques and tools. Integration of evidence from heterogeneous sources of data (e.g. disk images, network packet captures, logs) is often a manual and timeconsuming process relying significantly on the investigator's expertise. In this paper, we propose and develop an approach, based on the Semantic Web framework, for ontologically representing and integrating digital evidence. The presented approach enhances existing forensic analysis techniques by providing partial and eventually full automation of the investigative process.
Introduction
Digital investigations are increasingly becoming more complex dealing with the multitude and volume of digital evidence requiring analysis. According to [1] , "digital evidence of an incident is any digital data that contain reliable information that supports or refutes a hypothesis about the incident". The scope of digital evidence is constantly expanding, encompassing existing and new technologies such as computers, network logs and traffic captures, live memory, mobile devices etc. In this paper, the broader term of 'digital investigation' is used as a bridging concept between 'the use of scientifically derived and proven methods' [2] employed in the digital forensic science and the process that 'investigates and learns from such security breaches. [3] employed in incident response. Various frameworks [1] and process models [4] have been suggested due to the need to formalize and structure the set of techniques and methods employed during the different phases of the digital investigation. The analysis part is found to be the least formalized, often relying on the expertise and experience of the practitioner in order to assess the relevance of the data to the case and Available online at www.sciencedirect.com © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of KES International combine them in 'revealing' ways -tasks which are surely time-consuming and error-prone when performed manually and under co-operative schemes.
Definitely, specialized forensic and security tools significantly contribute and (semi-)automate parts of the analysis of the large volumes of digital data that may be collected during the digital investigation process. Such tools can be considered as interpreters between the different layers of abstraction that data can be manifested in, thus making analysis more 'investigator-friendly', in spite of additional types of errors they may introduce [5] . As an example, dispersed sets of disk sectors are combined by a file-system analysis tool, in order to reconstruct an allocated fragmented file; or multiple network packets reassembled by a protocol analysis tool, in order to reconstruct an application-layer 'conversation' enabling the investigator to review and assess their evidentiary value. However, such tools have been often characterized as first-generation tools [6] , mostly suited for manual analysis and having serious limitations handling large volumes of data.
The aforementioned tool limitations become even more apparent, considering the distributed nature of digital evidence in modern cases that pose requirements for enhanced tool interoperability and rich capabilities for integrating and correlating evidence. A large variety of digital forensic and security tools exists nowadays, both commercial and open-source, however in most cases with a high degree of specialization on a specific type of data source (e.g. file-system analysis, network protocol analysis, volatile memory analysis etc.). Even sophisticated integrated forensic platforms that encompass multiple tools and features (e.g. navigation, search and presentation as described in [7] ) often rely on proprietary, unstructured and/or undocumented formats for representing and reporting their results thus impairing their further integration. The need for establishing a standardized set of abstractions and data formats covering the possible data types encountered during a digital investigation as well as combining the results of various tools has already been well-described in the literature. [8] In this paper, we extend on previous proposals , [7, 9] , on employing Semantic Web technologies for the purposes of ontologically-based representation of digital evidence as well as (semi-)automated methods for evidence integration, especially across heterogeneous sources of data. We describe a method for semantically annotating digital evidence, integrating and searching over them as well as discuss a prototype implementation of a proof-of-concept platform that will be used as a basis for evaluating, further development and improvement of our approach.
Previous Work
The need for exchangeable and computer interpretable data formats across forensic applications has been quite evident as the field started maturing and has given rise to various approaches, although none yet quite widespread. One of the most prominent efforts has been the introduction of the Digital Forensics XML language (DFXML) as presented in [9] . This is an XML vocabulary that can describe in a structured manner the contents of a disk image such as volumes, files or even fragments of a file's contents in the form of byte runs along with their relevant metadata such as name, size, timestamps etc. The 'fiwalk' tool is also described in this paper that produces the DFXML representation given a disk image and supports existing digital evidence container formats such as AFF4 and EWF.
Similar approaches that have led to the definition of domain-specific XML languages have also been applied in other areas such as live memory forensics [10] , network forensics (PDML and PSML) as well as more generic approaches such as the Digital Evidence Exchange (DEX) format [11] and the XIRAF framework [12] . Although XML provides a common syntax that facilitates data interchange and encoding concerns, it lacks in terms of expressivity of what these elements and attributes mean and how they relate to each other. Thus a software agent, is limited in terms of what additional conclusions can be drawn from the set of given data or how to link elements defined under different namespaces.
Other approaches have employed the Resource Description Framework (RDF) data model as a way of annotating digital evidence with additional metadata. RDF adopts a data model where statements about a resource are expressed in the form of subject-predicate-object statements. The AFF4 [13] forensic format that acts as a container of digital evidence, has leveraged RDF's support for arbitrary and expressive attributes of standard or custom types, for asserting metadata about the contained digital evidence. Additionally, metadata about the investigative process (e.g. evidence access information, examiner information), as well as artifactrelated information generated during the investigation, can be expressed in the form of RDF statements; strengthening the chain of custody as described in [14] .
The architecture described in [15] defines a digital forensic ontology for expressive representation of forensically-relevant events and implemented a log parser that asserted ontologically-based axioms over given log datasets. The forensic ontology was built upon two main concepts, the Entity for representing tangible objects and the Event for representing the state of entities as changing over time. The author introduced also the FR3 correlation rule language so as to automate the inference of higher-level events out of combinations of lower level ones as well as infer causality links between events. This approach has been further extended in [16] providing the ability to express correlation rules that combined entities and events from disparate domains. A limitation of this approach was the reliance on a custom and limited rule language that affected its further extensibility and adoption in practice.
In a similar approach, the authors in [9, 18] have presented the DIALOG forensic ontology that conceptualized different aspects of the digital investigation and supports the encoding of results of forensic tools, additional metadata, content and events. The authors demonstrate the advanced analytical capabilities of such an evidence modeling approach by using SWRL-defined rules for composing higher level events (e.g. traces of a particular software installation) from aggregating Windows registry keys among multiple registry snapshots. Furthermore, they briefly describe how a reasoning engine such as Pellet [17] enables automated reclassification of resources and further querying over them using SQWRL. One possible limitation of this work is the adoption of a single forensic ontology which is difficult to achieve, both in matters of the complexity required to cover all areas of practice, but also the needed consensus among stakeholders. Our approach extends previous work by presenting a comprehensive method for semantic annotation and integration of digital evidence, originating from multiple and heterogeneous sources, based on a realistic multi-ontological setting.
A Semantically Enabled Method for Digital Evidence Representation and Integration
A method is specified in order to better structure our proposed approach for representing and integrating digital evidence from disparate sources. The method is presented in Figure 1 and defines some guidelines and processes on the basis of which such a solution is developed. The first step of data collection refers to any current and future forensic acquisition technique such as disk imaging, archived network packet captures, log files and etc. The goal of this step is to generate the required input for the remaining parts of the method. During this step, it is assumed that proper and sound acquisition practices are followed for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the collected data. Common preprocessing and data reduction techniques can also be employed in order to reduce the computational complexity of the remaining parts of the method. An example is the use of hash sets for filtering out files in the disk image that belong to the OS or well-known applications.
The second step of the method transforms the collected data, commonly expressed in heterogeneous data formats, into their semantic representation. OWL [18] , as an ontology language, is employed to model a domain of interest and formally define the pertinent concepts, properties and their interrelations. Our method follows a pragmatic approach where lightweight, domain-specific ontologies are developed, each conceptualizing and modeling a distinct type of a data source or practice (e.g. disk images, network packet captures).
During this step, specialized parsing and transformation tools are utilized that convert the collected data in their semantic representation, in accordance to the relevant ontologies. Alternatively, acquisition tools can be extended so as to support such forms of output (e.g. RDF/XML). The parsers produce RDF-based assertions that connect OWL individuals, named instances of ontological classes, with other OWL individuals or literal values through typed predicates. As an example, a forensic disk image is processed by a certain parser that generates semantic assertions that represent the file objects and declare them as members of the 'File' class. Additional assertions describe, in a machine-processable manner, their metadata (e.g. name, size, path, timestamps) as well as their relations to other individuals (e.g. a file contained in a directory). The sets of assertions that result from the various parsers and the multiple sources of data are aggregated into a single blank ontology, forming an OWL knowledge base.
The next step of the method, feeds the previously generated assertions into an OWL reasoning engine. An OWL reasoning engine infers further conclusions based on the asserted statements derived from the data source and the given ontology. The inferred assertions are later added to the set of assertions generated by the parsers. Typical use cases are the inference of class membership, property and inverse object property assertions. Class and property assertions are inferred by the reasoning engine taking into consideration the class and property hierarchies that have been defined in the ontology. As an example, given an OWL individual representing a file object that has been asserted to be of type 'ImageFile', the reasoning engine infers that it is also a member of its superclass 'MultimediaFile'. Such a capability enables the investigator to generalize or refine a query later on based on her needs (e.g. filter all the multimedia files or only the images).
However, OWL lacks the expressive power that would enable automated reasoning over more complex combinations of statements and conditions. Thus, rule-based reasoning engines are also employed for the formulation and execution of complex rules that can be specified by the investigator on a case-specific manner. The rule engine outputs additional inferred assertions that are also inserted in the existing OWL knowledge base. As an example, file objects with mismatching file header and file extension or abnormal timestamps (e.g. a last accessed timestamp earlier than the OS installation date) may raise suspicion and require additional focus by the investigator. A rule is specified that enables the rule engine to infer the assertion that the OWL individual representing the file object is a member of the custom-defined class 'InconsistentFile'.
It has to be noted that the two steps of reasoning are not meant to be performed exclusively in a sequential manner but rather in an iterative manner. A rule may consider previously inferred axioms by the reasoning engine as part of its conditions but also the reasoning engine can infer additional assertions based on the new links established after a rule execution. Rules are useful in establishing links between individuals that have been specified under different ontologies by the means of custom-defined properties (e.g. an OWL individual representing a TCP session, that transfers a file over the Web to the user's desktop, is linked with the OWL individual that represents the file stored in the disk).
In the final step of the method, the investigator uses SPARQL, an RDF-based query language, in order to formulate and execute queries against the integrated set of data as they have been semantically represented, reasoned and rule-connected from the previous steps. The underlying RDF data model can be natively represented as a graph with the subject and object being the nodes, with the predicate the edge connecting them. SPARQL is syntactically similar to SQL and allows searching over an RDF graph using pattern matching techniques. The investigator formulates queries over the set of collected and analyzed data as a pattern in the form of a set of RDF statements with the elements under search left as unbound variables. The SPARQL engine navigates throughout the whole RDF graph and upon matching a subset of it with the specific query pattern, populates and returns the queried variables.
The above described method provides an overview of the steps that need to be followed in order to semantically represent the collected evidence, reason over it using formal logic and link it in complex and expressive ways using a rule-based approach. Finally, the investigator navigates and queries over the resulting OWL knowledge base for identifying and retrieving case-relevant events and traces.
Semantic Representation of Digital Evidence
As explained before, the ontology plays a central role in the proposed method. To the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of well-established ontologies for modeling digital evidence in its various forms e.g. storage media, network traffic captures, logs of network devices such as firewalls, IDS etc. In addition to the above, it is quite commonplace in the frame of a digital investigation to employ sources of 'supportive' data that provide further contextual information to the investigator. Examples of such sources of data are file type identification tools that report the real type of a file, anti-malware engines that identify a potentially malicious file, domain name and registrar information that provide additional metadata about an IP address or a domain name such as the network they belong to and IP geo-location information.
For our research purposes, we have specified a number of lightweight OWL-based ontologies for describing different sources of data used in common cases of digital investigations. These domain ontologies have been created using the Protégé ontology editing tool [19] . The ontologies are available at the following URL link 'http://cs2lab.dsv.su.se/ontologies/'. Due to space limitations we will briefly present only two of them, the storage media and the network traffic capture ones.
The first ontology describes concepts and their relations in the scope of forensic analysis of storage media. Analysis of forensic images of storage media devices, such as hard disks, USB sticks, SD cards etc. is an essential part of most digital investigations. There are various technical variations on their underlying technology, e.g. SATA, SCSI, SSD as well as differences in the file systems used to organize and manage their contents, e.g. NTFS, FAT32, EXT3. A forensic image of such a storage media device is a copy of its contents so as to preserve and further analyze them. There are a number of data formats that a forensic image can be contained in like raw(dd), EWF, AFF etc. Numerous forensic tools exist that are capable of parsing such forensic image formats and reconstruct the underlying file systems and their contents. The tools presents the investigator with logical entities such as files and directories, even deleted or fragmented ones, as well as relevant metadata such as their file-type, hash signatures, status (e.g. hidden or deleted) etc. Such results are commonly used in order to determine possession of contraband material or analyze malware-infected systems.
The specification of the ontological classes pertinent to storage media analysis has been based on the DFXML markup language as described in [20] . The main concept in the ontology is that of a 'BinaryContent' which describes a sequence of binary data which represents either a whole disk image ('MediaDeviceImage'), a partition of it ('Partition'), a specific file ('File) or even a fragment of the file's content ('ByteRun'). The ontology also defines a set of object and data properties for specifying the relationships among the concepts and relevant metadata (e.g. the object property 'contains' describes the relationship among a file-system and the contained files or a file and its fragments ('ByteRuns'). An overview of the ontology is given in Figure 2 . Another source of data often employed in digital investigations is related to the analysis and reconstruction of network events (e.g. downloading contraband or malicious content) from captures of network traffic (e.g. 'pcap' format). Network protocol analysis tools, such as Wireshark, parse the captured bytes and reconstruct the network protocol layers (application, transport, network, link layers) and present the investigator detailed information about each protocol header field as well as the contained application data. More specialized Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFATs), e.g. 'NetworkMiner', are capable of assembling the packets into transport layer streams and even export complete files that have been communicated over the network.
The ontology designed for semantically representing captured network traffic has 'IPv4_Conversation' as a central concept that encompasses any type of communication over the IPv4 network protocol. An IP conversation between two IP addresses may include a set of TCP or UDP flows between different sets of source and destination ports. A transport layer flow may, in its turn, contain a set of application layer messages, like HTTP request and response messages. By further focusing on the HTTP protocol, due to its widespread use over the Internet, our ontology is connected with the RDF vocabulary of HTTP as specified by the W3C ERT working group [21] . As such the content exchanged over the HTTP protocol is formally annotated in a manner that is conducive for machine processing. Basic classes defined in our ontology are the concepts of 'IPAddress','Port', 'TCPFlow' and 'ApplicationLayerProtocol'. Relevant object and data properties have been also specified for connecting instantiations of these concepts. Examples are the 'hasSourceIP' and 'hasSourcePort' properties that connect the individuals representing an IP communication and TCP flow with the respective individuals representing the source IP address and network port respectively. An overview of the 'Network Traffic Analysis' ontology is given in Figure 3 . Appropriate parsers have been implemented that are given as input such files like forensic disk images or network packet captures and output their semantic representation based on the aforementioned ontologies. The parser generates a blank ontology for each evidence item given and individuals, referenced by unique URNs, are created as instantiations of the ontological classes. In order to generate a unique URN for each individual, a URN naming scheme of 'urn:<domain>:<case_id>:<evidence_item_id>:<resourcetype>:<unique_id>' is followed. The above naming scheme serves also as the lineage of any evidence item as it can provide the investigator with a quick overview of the evidence item and the case it originates from. The following phrase shows a sample URN according to the followed convention. urn:cs2lab.dsv.su.se:Case101:DiskA01:IPAddress:8fa3-431a3-382c-e021
An example of such a parser output that represents a file object is given below. The parsers use the OWL API which is a Java API that enables programmatic creation, modification and serialization of OWL ontologies. The output is serialized in the RDF/XML format although other ones such as OWL/XML, Turtle, KRSS are also supported.
<owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="urn:cs2lab.dsv.su.se:Case101:DiskA01:file:0ab2-39fc2-3418-0492"> <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://cs2lab.dsv.su.se/ontologies/StorageMedia.owl#File"/> <StorageMedia:hasFileCreationTime rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime"> 2012-03-03T09:33:26 </DigitalMedia:hasFileCreationTime> <StorageMedia:hasSize rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">262144</DigitalMedia:hasSize> <StorageMedia:hasMD5 rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">7f06088db67446d95d0c4801c</Digital Media:hasMD5> <StorageMedia:hasParent rdf:resource="urn:cs2lab.dsv.su.se:Case101:DiskA01:Directory:38f9-23bb1-4920-ac94"/> </owl:NamedIndividual>
Semantic Integration of Digital Evidence
In order to establish semantic links between multiple identical or related individuals, an integration process is followed. Three main issues have been identified in our research where integration needs to be established among individuals based on the namespace they belong to (the URN identifier's namespace which maps to the evidence item they are contained in) and the domain ontology whose classes they instantiate.
Integration of individuals under the same namespace and the same domain ontology
Given that the namespace of a URN identifier maps to the evidence item where the individual is contained in, this case refers to the semantic representation of an individual (e.g. a specific IP address) that appears multiple times in the same evidence item. In order to avoid the inefficiency of multiple individuals representing the same entity, the parsing tools are implemented so as to ensure that a single OWL individual is generated for each distinct entity. This has been implemented using 'HashMaps' that keep track of the literal values as keys and the given URN identifiers as values. Therefore, the parser checks before assigning a new URN identifier to an individual if there has already been assigned one for the specific key (e.g. an IP address or a file object pathname). Thus, a single OWL Individual may participate in multiple statements either as a subject or object (e.g. an IP address that appears both as a source IP in some IP communications and as destination IP in others).
Integration of individuals under different namespaces but the same domain ontology
Given the URN identifier naming scheme described before, the same entity may appear multiple times in different evidence items and consequently be identified by different URNs. An example is the analysis of multiple network traffic capture files collected from different network segments that contain traces of multiple communications against a single remote IP. However, all individuals will be instances of the same class defined in the domain ontology; the 'IPAddress' class of the 'Network Traffic Analysis' ontology. OWL2 offers various inferencing features for treating such cases.
OWL2 offers the capability to declare a set of object or data properties as a key to a class expression by the 'hasKey' property. Let us consider the literal value of an IP address of a host as a key that can uniquely identify that host. By specifying that the 'hasIPAddressValue' data property is a key for the 'IPAddress' class, the reasoning engine automatically links two named instances under different namespaces that refer to the same IP address by the 'owl:sameAs' property. This allows for automatic integration of entities that may appear in multiple evidence files and significantly ease the investigator's analysis.
Integration of individuals under different namespaces and different domain ontologies
The consolidation of named instances that may refer to the same or similar entities but are contained in different types of evidence is a much harder issue. An example can be given of a file object contained in a hard disk image but also extracted from a network traffic capture as a file download over HTTP. The parsing tools would have generated more than one named instances for referencing the same entity under different namespaces and as instances of classes that belong to different domain ontologies. Thus, the reasoning engine cannot automatically link these named instances since they are of different types. Using the 'equivalentClass' property provided by OWL cannot also alleviate this issue since this would just infer that a particular named instance is member of both classes, but will not entail that the named instances are the same.
In our approach, we deal with this issue employing the rule engine and properly defined rules. Currently, we utilize SPARQL for defining rules (CONSTRUCT queries) over the less standardized SWRL rule language. An example of such a rule is given below where 'df' is the prefix for the namespace of the 'Storage Media' ontology and 'nf' resolves to the namespace of the 'Network Traffic' ontology:
CONSTRUCT {?u2 owl:sameAs ?u1.} WHERE {?u1 a df:File ?u2 a http:Content. ?u1 df:hasMD5Value ?md5_1. ?u2 nf:hasContentMD5 ?md5_2. FILTER (?u1!=?u2 && ?md5_1=?md5_2 && ?md5_1!="")} The rule engine searches for all named instances that participate in statements with the given predicates and have the same literal values as objects. The rule engine then links the named instances by the 'sameAs' property. Similar rules may also be specified that integrate named instances with different user-specific or domain-specific properties in the case that the 'sameAs' semantics are considered quite strong.
In this section we have discussed some of the issues that may arise in a (multi-)ontological setting where multiple named instances of the same or similar entities may be the result of the semantic representation of multiple evidence items of the same or different nature. We have discussed three main cases where such linking among named instances is needed and showcased how they are handled by our method.
Evidence Search
Once the original evidence data have been semantically represented, aggregated and integrated with the steps described before, the total set of assertions is available to the investigator to navigate and search through. The set of assertions is loaded on a SPARQL endpoint (e.g. Apache Jena Fuseki) and further examined by investigator formulated SPARQL queries.
We have implemented a proof of concept system that comprises of a set of domain-specific parsers along with respective lightweight ontologies that model various types of data commonly used in a digital investigation such as disk forensic images, network packet captures etc. The proof of concept is demonstrated using the example of a 'drive-by download' case as described below:
A number of a company's employees receive a phishing email, prompting them to visit a compromised site that redirects their browser automatically to a malicious website acting as an exploit server. The exploit server serves appropriately crafted content (e.g. Javascript code) that takes advantage of a browser's security vulnerability and allows the download and execution of arbitrary files. A Trojan-dropper file [22] is copied to the users' local hard drive and executed thus creating additional malicious files (e.g. backdoors, keyloggers). Traces of abnormal system and network activity may initiate a digital investigation procedure by the security administrator that collects forensic images of the users' disk drives, as well as previously captured network traffic originated from the systems.
The collected evidence items are first loaded to the respective parsing tools. The parsers generate assertions that semantically represent the evidence items as discussed in Section 4. The set of generated assertions are aggregated in a blank ontology that later is fed to the Pellet reasoning engine and the SPARQL rule engine. The reasoner infers assertions that link the OWL individuals representing the 'Trojan-dropper' file for each evidence item by the 'owl:sameAs' predicate. The reasoning engine entails this assertiond since the 'hasMD5' data property has been defined as a key for the 'File' class of the 'Storage Media' ontology. The rule engine, as discussed in Section 5, establishes additional links between the same file representation among disk and network traffic occurences based on the same MD5 value. A sample output is shown below <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="urn:cs2lab.dsv.su.se:Case101:DiskA01:file:0ab2-39fc2-3418-0492"> <owl:sameAs rdf:resource=" urn:cs2lab.dsv.su.se:Case101:DiskA04:file:cf18-947ba-01df-40c8"> <owl:sameAs rdf:resource=" urn:cs2lab.dsv.su.se:Case101:PcapB01:content:e5c7-88c0a-3199-4fb1"> </owl:NamedIndividual>
The investigator can express SPARQL queries which enables discovery of complex patterns and relationships among the collected data. An example query can inform the investigator of 'Which files, of the same content are downloaded from the Web and have been found in multiple systems?'. Samples of such queries can be found at the web link "http://cs2lab.dsv.su.se/queries". The answer to the query contains the systems that were affected, the names and locations of the file in each system as well as the URL, IP address and the timestamp from where and when they were downloaded from. This is achieved since the query engine navigates through the graph and extracts additional metadata associated with the linked OWL individuals presented above.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented some of the issues of our ongoing development of an evidence analysis, integration and correlation methodology for digital investigations based on semantic technologies. The proposed approach encompasses a number of Semantic Web technologies and languages for representing digital evidence in a semantic manner and (semi-)automate parts of the analysis using the reasoning capabilities of the former. The methodology has the potential to alleviate contemporary manual and non-interoperable processes and tools employed in digital investigations.
The future work, among other things, will concentrate on the development of a user-friendly graphical interface that will enable the investigator to graphically navigate the data in a 'linked-graph' manner as well formulate and execute rules and queries without the need of knowing the SPARQL language structure and syntax
